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Abstract
We characterize the optimal policy-mix towards RDactivity and output production in the
simultaneous moves mixed and private duopolies, as well as in the Stackelberg mixed
duopoly. Our findings suggest that the government will opt for implementing jointly a tax on
RDwith a subsidy on output to tackle the underlying market failures. Moreover, the optimal
output subsidy, RDinvestment, output and welfare are identical irrespective of whether the
public firm: (i) moves simultaneously with the private firm, (ii) is Stackelberg leader in
RDand/or output, or (iii) is privatized and acts simultaneously with the private firm to
maximize profits. Privatization reduces the optimal tax on Rbut leads to an increase in firms'
profits. Finally, Stackelberg output leadership by the public firm induces an increase in
RDtaxation, which is accompanied by a decrease in profits.
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The study of mixed oligopolies has become increasingly popular over the last decade.
While most of the existing work focuses on output, pricing and managerial incentives,
empirical evidence suggests that public ￿rms are present in highly innovative industries;
for instance, in health-care. Indeed, they engage in R&D projects to enhance their
organisational arrangements and introduce new processes of a lower cost (Aanestad et
al. 2003). Further, the public sector has traditionally contributed to the development of
national innovation systems in several countries (Katz 2001).
Among the noteworthy exceptions dealing with innovation in a mixed market is Del-
bono and Denicol￿ (1993). Their main conclusion is that a public ￿rm may be used as a
regulatory instrument for alleviating the overinvestment problem in the private duopoly.
This result is derived under the assumption of perfect patent protection. Building on
this observation, Poyago￿ Theotoky (1998) considered the more plausible case of easy im-
itation, ￿nding that indeed almost all the main results of Delbono and Denicol￿ can be
reversed. Relying on a non-tournament model for R&D, Nett (1994) studied the public
￿rm￿ s behaviour in choosing to produce at a higher than the private ￿rm￿ s marginal cost
and showed that privatization may be welfare-improving. However, none of these papers
investigated the potential role of public policy towards R&D. To this regard, it is worth
stressing that in the real world, R&D subsidies have often promoted many technology
discoveries with an example being biotechnology (see, for instance, Hart 1998).
An established result in the literature on mixed oligopoly￿ without consideration of
innovation issues￿ is that the optimal output subsidy, as well as the ￿rst-best pro￿ts,
output and welfare are identical whether the public ￿rm: (i) moves simultaneously with
the private ￿rms, (ii) is a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) is privatized and acts simultaneously
with the private ￿rms to maximize pro￿ts (White 1996; Poyago￿ Theotoky 2001; Myles
2002).
However, we do not know to what extent the same outcome obtains when innovation is
added into the frame of analysis, as well as whether a subsidy or tax will then be optimal.
In order to address this issue, we propose a model that consists of an R&D market and
a market for the (￿nal) good. In this situation, the government faces distortions along
both dimensions of production. Indeed, the combined use of ￿ corrective￿policies towards
R&D and output is considered (with a view to restoring the ￿rst-best optimum).
Our main ￿ndings can be summarised as follows. The government will opt for taxing
R&D while subsidizing output production. Furthermore, the optimal output subsidy,
R&D, output and welfare are the identical irrespective of whether the public ￿rm: (i)
moves simultaneously with the private ￿rm, (ii) is a Stackelberg leader in R&D and/or
output and (iii) is privatized and acts simultaneously with the private ￿rm to maximize
pro￿ts. Privatization reduces the optimal tax on R&D but increases ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Fi-
nally, Stackelberg output leadership by the public ￿rm induces an increase in the R&D
tax, whereas a reduction in ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
2 The model
We consider the following duopoly setting. The market consists of a public and a private
￿rm, producing a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function is P(Q) = a ￿ Q,
Q ￿ a, where Q = q0 +q1 denotes total output quantity that is made up, respectively, of
a public and a private component. Both ￿rms conduct process R&D that reduces their
1marginal production cost by an amount xi, 0 < xi ￿ c, i 2 f0;1g. We assume that
such activity is perfectly protected against imitation and its cost is given by ￿i = x2
i,
i 2 f0;1g, which entails diminishing returns to the level of R&D expenditure. Further,
￿rms receive a subsidy along both dimensions of their production. That is, Sx = sxxi,
Sq = sqqi, denote the per-unit subsidy to R&D output and output quantity, respectively.
We also allow for negative values of a subsidy, i.e., a tax can be optimal.
Thus a ￿rm￿ s overall cost function (net of subsidies) is given by:
Ci(xi;qi) = (c ￿ xi)qi + q
2
i + ￿i ￿ Sx ￿ Sq; (1)
where xi the i-th ￿rm￿ s R&D ouput and a > c > 0.1
Accordingly, the relevant pro￿t functions are:
￿i = P(Q)qi ￿ Ci(xi;qi): (2)
Social welfare, de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus, CS = (1=2)Q2 and ￿rms￿
pro￿ts, net of subsidies, is:
W = CS + ￿i + ￿j ￿ sx(xi + xj) ￿ sq(qi + qj); i 6= j; i;j 2 f0;1g: (3)
Note that the direct e⁄ect of a subsidy on welfare is zero, as it constitutes a transfer
payment. However, the standard indirect e⁄ect amounts to saying that welfare will be
a⁄ected via any change in the rate of subsidy, which will (directly) impact the private
competitor￿ s decision variables. Thus welfare rewrites:




[(a ￿ qi ￿ qj)qi ￿ (c ￿ xi)qi ￿ x
2
i]: (4)
We investigate three Stackelberg and two Cournot games. In all cases considered, the
government ￿rst commits to both an R&D and an output subsidy.2 In the next stage,
the public ￿rm invests in R&D as the leader or simultaneously with the private ￿rm. In
the third stage, ￿rms choose their output levels either simultaneously or with the public
￿rm being the leader. We also examine the case where the public ￿rm is privatized and
acts simultaneously with the private ￿rm in both R&D (second stage) and output (third
stage) to maximize pro￿ts. Each game is solved by backward induction to obtain its
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE henceforth).
1It is worth stressing that a ￿rm￿ s R&D investment shifts its marginal cost curve downwards, mci =
(c ￿ xi) + 2qi, while it does not alter its slope. This is the same e⁄ect that process R&D has on
production costs in d￿Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and subsequent authors, where production
costs are assumed to be linear. The inclusion of a quadratic term in the (total) cost function is standard
in the mixed oligopoly literature and serves the purpose of ruling out the uninteresting case of a public
monopoly.
2We assume that commitment to both instruments takes place simultaneously. Alternatively, it can
be shown that sequential commitment, preceding the decisions on R&D and output, would have no e⁄ect
on the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, as it will become evident from our analysis, a tax on R&D
output will only emerge in the SPNE of the games considered, i.e., there is no ex ante commitment of
the government to a negative subsidy.
22.1 The simultaneous moves mixed duopoly
At the last stage of the game, each ￿rm chooses an output level to maximize its objective.









2(a ￿ c) + 3x1 ￿ x0 + 3sq
11
, (5)
where ￿ c￿stands for Cournot. At the preceding stage, ￿rms make their R&D choices
for given subsidies, anticipating how their decisions will a⁄ect competition at the output









396(a ￿ c) + 2167sx + 648sq
3674
. (6)
Note the standard cost-redistribution e⁄ect of the policy instruments as in (5) and (6).













This result, new to the literature, shows that the optimal policy-mix consists in sub-
sidizing output while taxing R&D activity. Although actual practice tends to provide
tax concessions or subsidies rather than taxes to R&D, we may explain this somewhat
surprising ￿nding by referring to the objectives of public policy.
Before proceeding, examples of public funds towards R&D in mixed markets may be
useful in opening the discussion of the issue at hand. The Norwegian oil industry con-
sists of the state-owned company Statoil that competes with two private ￿rms, Norske
Shell (or Shell Technology) and Exxon (Pal 1998). Emerging technologies, such as fuel
cells and hydrogen technologies are priority on their agenda and are related to Norway￿ s
participation in energy oriented R&D projects within the EU, ie., the 5th and 6th Frame-
work Programmes (see Godł et al. 2003). The development of these technologies is part
of national innovation policies, as such potentially radical innovations are often subject
to important market failures (Godoe and Nygaard 2006).4 To this regard, established in
2001 is Enova, a public organization with main aim to subsidize enviromentally clean (and
e¢ cient) energy technologies.5 Moreover, the Research Council of Norway is responsible
for directing public funds towards R&D, which form part of the budgets of the Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy.6
To proceed with our intuition, consider the case prior to any public intervention. In
this situation, the public ￿rm produces an output for which marginal cost equals price,
as in models with an output focus alone (De Fraja and Delbono 1989). In contrast, the
private ￿rm chooses a lower output such that marginal cost exceeds price. Furthermore,
total production is below the social optimum level (see Appendix A).7 Thus, the govern-
3The second order conditions, which are available upon request, are all ful￿lled.
4This is illustrated in what follows.
5Public funding to R&D in promoting innovations in fuel cells and related hydrogen technologies was
approximately US$ 18 millions in 2001 (Godł et. al., 2003).
6In Greece, the telecommunications industry is another example of mixed oligopoly. Currently, there
are debates on denationalizing some part of the National Telecommunications company (OTE), which
has traditionally received subsidies from the state.
7Note that in the absence of any subsidies towards R&D or output, the public ￿rm overproduces (both
in terms of R&D and output) relative to the social optimum, whereas the private ￿rm underproduces. The
3ment is faced with the two standard failures of a mixed market: underproduction and
ine¢ ciency in the allocation of production costs across ￿rms. The fact that the distor-
tions on the side of R&D reinforce the ones on the side of output is unique to the current
model and is in fact taken into account by the government when designing the optimal
policies (i.e., the ￿rst-best allocation can be restored as we shall see).8
Turning to the optimal intervention, assume ￿rst that the government has only an
output subsidy at her disposal. This implies that a second-best optimum can be reached,
since there is only one instrument available and two targets to be controlled for (Leahy
and Neary 1997). Moreover, the second-best allocation does re￿ ect overinvestment in
R&D (relative to the case of the ￿rst-best).9 The reason is that even though the public
￿rm underinvests in R&D, the private ￿rm overinvests. As a result, it is possible, and
turns out to be the case that the private ￿rm can redress the balance and indeed can yield
an amount of total investment beyond the social optimum. These results are presented
in Appendix B.
An immediate implication of this observation is that it now becomes socially bene￿cial
for the government to tax R&D. This result is also reminiscent of the ￿nding by Leahy
and Neary (1997), who showed (in the context of a purely private market) that R&D
should be taxed, when there are no spillovers or even if spillovers are low enough, and
actions are strategic substitutes (the latter is supported by the current model). More
importantly, the optimal tax will be accompanied by an increase in the amount of output
subsidy10 in order to counteract the associated reduction in private output due to the
introduction of R&D taxation (and hence eliminate the gap between price and marginal
cost). Thus, it is important to mention that the result of imposing a tax on R&D is
combined in the sense that the introduction of a policy scheme aimed at ￿ correcting￿the
failures along the side of innovation takes into account how this may in￿ uence welfare
along the side of output (with also the reverse to hold).11
public ￿rm￿ s behaviour, however, cannot redress the balance, implying that the total level of production
remains suboptimal.
8It is worth noting that while the market failures related to output production (underproduction and
ine¢ ciently distributed production costs) have received some attention in the respective literature, the
ones related to R&D seem much less recognised. More precisely, the private ￿rm does not take into
account consumer surplus in its objective function and therefore carries out less investment compared to
the social optimum (so-called under-valuation e⁄ect). However, the public ￿rm￿ s behaviour, being con-
sistent with welfare maximization, partially alleviates the ensuing under-investment problem. Therefore,
the task of the government still remains to address underproduction in addition to the ine¢ ciency in the
distribution of post-innovation cost.
9The ￿rst-best optimum is de￿ned as a public duopoly due to diminishing returns in production (both
for R&D and output).






1750175 < 0, where the asterisc denotes the socially
optimal output subsidy and ￿ sq￿denotes the case of the subsidised mixed duopoly with an output subsidy
alone.
11By way of contrast, recent work by Gil Molto et al. (2006) characterizing the optimal intervention
with a subsidy to R&D alone, showed that the existence of market failures justify positive rather than
negative subsidies (i.e., taxes) at the case of the second-best optimum.




































Notice that the SPNE obtained is characterized by some undesirable redistributional
e⁄ects. Although output quantity, R&D spending, welfare and consumer surplus are at
the ￿rst-best, it turns out that the interaction between a tax on R&D with a subsidy on
output entails a net positive e⁄ect on pro￿ts, thus overshooting the social optimum (i.e.,
￿c
i > ￿￿
i = (3=49)(a ￿ c)2; i 2 f0;1g).
The intuition behind the latter is related to the way that the cost redistribution
e⁄ect of the optimal policies operates. More precisely, the driving forces behind the
equilibrium outcome are the direct e⁄ect of the subsidy (and tax) on one side, and
their subsequent indirect e⁄ect on the other side. That is, a change in the rate of an
instrument will directly a⁄ect the private ￿rm￿ s behaviour, inducing then an indirect
change in the public ￿rm￿ s decision variables (see eq. (4), (2) and (1)). Conversely, there
is a cost redistribution e⁄ect, implying a reallocation of production from the public to the
private competitor. It turns out that, due to the optimality of the policy instruments,
the reduction in the public ￿rm￿ s R&D and output and the countervailing increase in
the private ￿rm￿ s production, will not only balance one another but also promote an
increase in aggregate investment and in the output production levels (i.e., the policy
tools can tackle both market failures). In turn, this corresponds to the social optimum,
where the ￿rms￿production is indeed equalized (i.e., productive e¢ ciency is attained and
underproduction resolved). Nevertheless, the public ￿rm and its private rival may still
make a larger pro￿t than the level dictated by the optimal allocation.
2.2 The simultaneous moves private duopoly
We proceed to solve for the SPNE in the private duopoly. The solutions for output, price,
output subsidy, consumer surplus and welfare coincide with the ones in the simultaneous
moves mixed duopoly. The same does not hold true for the remainder equilibrium values














where ￿ p￿denotes the case of the private duopoly.
















According to part (i); privatization increases ￿rms￿pro￿ts (for instance, De Fraja and
Delbono 1989). The intuition for part (ii), being less obvious, can be exposed as follows.
In both the mixed and the private duopolies, the task of the government is to ￿ correct￿
distortions along both dimensions of production (R&D and output), while taking into
5account the potential feedback of the optimal policies on one another. In particular,
the mixed duopoly su⁄ers from both underproduction and ine¢ ciency in the distribution
of equilibrium costs. In the private duopoly, however, the latter distortion vanishes as
￿rms conduct the same level of R&D (and produce the same amount of output). Hence,
naturally, a tax on R&D will be less e⁄ective, and thus lower, in the post-privatization
setting.12 Further, notice that the standard irrelevance result for the optimal output
subsidy obtains (i.e., privatization has no consequences on the optimal output subsidy).
2.3 The Stackelberg mixed duopoly
As expected, we obtain the same SPNE outcome as in the simultaneous moves mixed
duopoly. This amounts to saying that when the government has a su¢ cient number of
instruments at her discretion￿ to ￿ correct￿for the underlying failures of a mixed market￿
she may then restore the ￿rst-best allocation, at least partially. Consequently, the order
of the ￿rms￿moves is not relevant given that the social optimum is unique (see Poyago￿
Theotoky 2001).
2.4 Irrelevance of the optimal output subsidy
As discussed in the introduction, the so-called irrelevance result shows that the optimal
output subsidy (as well as pro￿ts, output, welfare) coincide independently of whether
the public ￿rm: (i) moves simultaneously with the private ￿rms, (ii) is a Stackelberg
leader, or (iii) is privatized and moves simultaneously with the private ￿rms to maximize
pro￿ts. In this paper we have studied so far the existence of the irrelevance result in
terms of the R&D activity. As a next step, it would be interesting to examine whether
the same outcome applies to the optimal output subsidy. To this regard, following the
seminal contributions by White (1996) and Poyago￿ Theotoky (2001) as in (i)￿ (iii), one
additional case needs to be taken into account; the public ￿rm moving as the leader
in output, whereas investing in R&D simultaneously with the private ￿rm. (It can be
readily veri￿ed that when the public ￿rm retains Stackelberg leadership in both R&D
and output the same SPNE obtains.)
Solving for the SPNE of this game by backward induction, we are able to con￿rm the
irrelevance of the optimal output subsidy. This adds to a series of related results in the
literature by treating within a uni￿ed framework a number of issues: R&D activity, output
production and the optimal public intervention. Hence, the optimal output subsidy does
not depend on whether the public ￿rm acts as a Stackelberg leader in R&D and/or output;
in addition to this, it remains independent of the government￿ s decision to privatize the
public ￿rm. This is because provided that the government has a su¢ cient number of
policy tools at her disposal, then she may restore the ￿rst-best allocation.13 In this case,
privatization as well as the order of ￿rms￿moves bear no consequences on the output
subsidy, R&D, output and welfare, since the social optimum is unique.
Interestingly, the optimal R&D subsidy does depend on the timing of moves￿ and as
was shown on privatization; in fact, it is higher compared to the case of the simultaneous
12Fjell and Heywood (2004) provide a similar intuitive argument for a model without R&D spending.
Recall also that in the present setting the result of taxing R&D activity should be viewed as combined
with that of subsidizing the production of output.
13Recall that in the ￿ form￿of social optimum obtained, R&D, output and welfare are at the ￿rst-best
except for the ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
6moves mixed duopoly. That is,
js
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Recall that when the government subsidizes output alone, the second-best requires
that the total amount of R&D investment is beyond the social optimum. In this case,
it turns out that total investment under Stackelberg output leadership by the public
￿rm is higher than under the Cournot conjecture. As a result, it is optimal for the
government to tax R&D more heavily in the former case with a view to restoring the
optimal allocation (together with the use of an output subsidy). Finally, higher R&D
taxation will naturally reduce ￿rms￿pro￿ts compared to the simultaneous moves mixed














; i 2 f0;1g. (12)
3 Conclusion
Using a simple model, we have characterized the optimal policy intervention both for
R&D and output. Our results show that the government will optimally tax the amount
of R&D invested, whereas it will subsidize the production of output. The reason is that
an optimal output subsidy alone tends to increase R&D above the welfare-maximizing
level and so mandates an R&D tax. Moreover, what matters here is the inter-relation
between the innovation and the output markets and indeed the potential feedback e⁄ects
of the employed policies on one another. Therefore, the introduction of R&D taxation
calls for an increase in the amount of output subsidy at the ￿rst-best allocation (relative
to the second-best allocation). This also suggests that the result of taxing R&D activity
should be viewed as combined with that of subsidizing the production of output.
Our ￿ndings con￿rm the ￿irrelevance result￿for the optimal output subsidy, R&D
investment, output and welfare. Since the government has available two instruments
to control for the market failures at work (underproduction and ine¢ cient allocation of
production costs), she may then restore the ￿rst-best allocation. Indeed, whether the
public ￿rm moves as a leader in R&D and/or output is not relevant, since the optimal
allocation is unique; in addition to this, the government￿ s decision to privatize the public
￿rm is without consequences. The only exception is the tax on R&D, which is conditional
on the order of ￿rms￿moves and the possibility for privatization.
Finally, it is worth noting that when the public ￿rm remains as a Stackelberg leader
in the post-privatization regime (a case not considered here), this will naturally induce a
reduction in the rate of both policy instruments. The rationale is that the e⁄ectiveness of
both instruments will be lower after privatization, with the reason being that the optimal
subsidy (combined with a tax) cannot restore cost e¢ ciency. Indeed, as the privatized
leader always produces more than the follower, this will imply a higher marginal cost for
the leader (see also Fjell and Heywood 2004).
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Appendix
A. Unsubsidized mixed duopoly
Solving this game by the same procedure (as in case 2:1) for sx = 0 and sq = 0, we




























= mc0(0), mc1(0) =
48a + 119c
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The social optimum, de￿ned as the case of two public ￿rms due to diminishing returns







; i 2 f0;1g:
We proceed to show that the (unsubsidized) mixed duopoly is characterized by un-
derproduction in both R&D and output (relative to the social optimum):












B. Mixed duopoly with output subsidies
When an output subsidy is available, the SPNE outcomes of the entire game (denoted















































Comparing the R&D investment with the social optimum both for the private and
the public ￿rm, we obtain that the private ￿rm overinvests, whereas the public ￿rm



























Notice further that the public ￿rm chooses an output such that price equals marginal
cost. The gap between price and marginal cost of the private ￿rm is smaller compared




















[P(0) ￿ mc1(0)] ￿ [P
sq ￿ mc
sq
1 ] =
7655637(a ￿ c)
41754175
.
10